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This paper addresses three electric utility issues that all speak to the 
issue of improving cash flow for utilities at a time when costly construction 
programs, consumer-conscious regulation, and uncertain demand projections, 
have made it difficult for utilities to meet the requirements of investors. 
To summarize, the three issues are: (1) whether Congress should require the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to insist that companies applying 
for inclusion of construction work in progress (CWIP) in their rate bases 
demonstrate that all less expensive alternatives to building new plants have 
been tried; (2) whether Congress should amend the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act (PUHCA) to permit registered holding companies to own 
subsidiaries which are not related to electricity generation and to invest up 
to 10% of their assets in these subsidiaries without Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) approval; and (3) whether Congress should take action to 
finance completion of Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) nuclear 
plant #3. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
Admitting Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) to the Rate Base 
Should Congress act to limit the conditions under which FERC may admit 
CWIP to the rate base? When CWIP is admitted to the rate base, utilities may 
charge ratepayers for the cost of plants still under construction. When CWIP 
is not admitted to the rate base, utilities may not charge customers for the 
cost of a new plant until it begins operation. 
Since FERC regulates only interstate and wholesale power sales (about 12% 
of U.S. power revenues), admission of CWIP to the FERC-regulated rate base 
would only apply to that portion of CWIP which would eventually generate 
power for wholesale or interstate sale. However, more than half the States 
now admit CWIP to the State-regulated rate base under specific conditions. 
From 1976 to 1983, FERC had admitted CWIP only for pollution control, for 
fuel-switching and, according to its stated policy, in cases where severe 
financial difficulty could be demonstrated. However, over this 7-year 
period, the Commission did not admit any CWIP for severe financial 
difficulty. 
In May 1983, the FERC commissioners issued a new rule that would change 
FERC8s standards for admitting CWIP to the FERC-regulated rate base. Under 
the new rule, FERC will allow utilities under its jurisdiction to file for 
rates that include a return on up to 502 of their investme.nt in CWIP. The 
extent of the inclusion, however, would be limited to amounts that would 
increase rates by no more than 6% per year above what they would otherwise 
be. 
H.R. 555 (passed by the House in February 1984) restricts FERC to its 
pre-1983 standard in allowing CWIP, with the extra provision that a utility 
filing for inclusion of CWIP must demonstrate that there is no more 
cost-effective way to augment its capacity than to build new plants. A 
similar bill, S. 1069, is before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources. This bill is described in detail under Legislation. 
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Since the late 1970s, increasing costs linked with declining demand for 
electricity have put many utilities under intense financial pressure. 
Particularly hard-pressed are those companies that are building nuclear 
plants, which require long-term commitments of large (and growing) amounts of 
capital. Without including CWIP in the rate base, companies cannot reclaim 
these large expenditures (running more than a billion dollars per plant over 
a period of 8 to 14 years) from the ratepayers until the plant goes into 
service. 
Although, when CWIP is not admitted, the amounts spent on construction'are 
listed on income statements as income in the form of Allowance for Funds Used 
During Construction (AFUDC), they do not constitute cash income for the 
company. The effect on a company's cash flow, since the generation of 
electricity is a particularly capital intensive operation, is equivalent to 
having a significant portion of its assets in long overdue accounts 
receivable. This situation is referred to as "poor quality of earnings," and 
inevitably has a negative effect on a company's bond ratings. 
A utility company which has poor Cash flow often also has a low ratio of 
pretax earnings to fixed interest charges, a problem referred to as "low 
interest coverage ratio." Since utility bond indentures typically require an 
interest coverage ratio of 2.0 as a minimum, a falling interest coverage 
ratio will probably result in a lowered bond rating for the utility. Low 
bond ratings mean that a company must pay a higher interest rate to secure 
capital. Thus, the inability to charge ratepayers immediately for funds 
spent for COnStrUCtiOn can result in higher construction costs. 
Those who object to the admission of CWIP to the rate base do so on 
grounds that admitting CWIP (1) contradicts the regulatory principle that 
ratepayers should pay for plants only when they are used and useful; (2) may 
ease the way for power companies to build unneeded capacity in a period when 
most regions of the United States have excess capacity; and (3) may encourage 
utilities to expand plant as rapidly as possible in order to enlarge their 
rate bases and thereby increase both cash flow and profits. In a period of 
uncertain growth in demand for electricity and numerous plant cancellations, 
critics of CWIP want to be certain that utilities are building only those 
plants which are needed and that they will not have to cancel them after 
millions have been spent for partial completion. 
Reevaluating the Public Utility Holding Company Act 
Should Congress amend the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
(PUHCA) to remove the restrictions on the registered public utility holding 
companies against acquiring subsidiaries that are not related to the 
generation and delivery of electricity? Supporters of proposed reform 
legislation (S. 1174 and H.R. 2994) say its purpose is to lower the cost of 
capital to the registered utility holding companies by permitting them to 
diversify their activities. 
The plan of some utilities to diversify is based on the assumption that a 
non-utility would earn a greater return on equity than a utility and would 
thereby qualify for lower interest rates on borrowed capital than the 
utility. If the subsidiary business did earn a higher return onOequity, the 
effect might be to lower the average cost of capital to the holding company, 
benefiting ratepayers as well as the utility. 
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The proposed reform bills would remove the requirement that subsidiaries 
of registered holding companies perform Only functions related to electricity 
generation and transmission, and would require the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to approve or disapprove holding company security issuances 
within 20 days of application for approval. 
The reform bill also exempts certain issues of securities from SEC review. 
For example, holding company financing of each non-utility subsidiary in 
amounts up to 10% of the holding company's outstanding securities or assets 
would be exempt from SEC review. Investments greater than 10% of the holding 
company's assets could be approved by the SEC if it determined that such 
would not constitute an unreasonable risk to consumers or investors. Hence, 
under the reform act, a utility could gain a possible, but by no means 
guaranteed, reduced cost of capital. On the other hand, since the 10% 
ceiling on investment in subsidiaries would apply to the assets of the 
holding company and not to those of the subsidiaries (some of which would be 
utilities), a holding company could, unquestioned by Federal regulators and 
perhaps unquestioned by State regulators, risk utility capital in amounts 
considerably larger than 10% of the utility's assets. 
Those who object to the reform measure do so because originally PUHCA was 
enacted to correct certain abuses which holding companies were able to 
inflict on utility ratepayers and investors because they were, in effect, 
unregulated holding companies. Lack of interstate regulation made it 
possible, before 1935, for 13 large holding companies to control 
three-fourths of the privately owned electric utilities, and for 11 holding 
companies to own more than 80% of the natural gas pipelines in the United 
States. The multi-State structure of the holding company made it impossible 
for the regulators of any one State to track its activities. In this period, 
holding companies acquired subsidiaries scattered about the Nation; withheld 
vital information from investors, charged utilities unreasonable rates for 
services from subsidiaries, extended systems and investments without regard 
for the financial effect on the utilities, and obstructed State regulation. 
PUHCA, as enacted in 1935, empowered the SEC to limit the makeup of 
holding companies to integrated systems; required all services provided by 
affiliated companies to be provided at reasonable cost; required SEC approval 
of acquisitions of other utilities; and prohibited use of utility funds to 
finance non-utility ventures. The Act required companies which had 
subsidiaries that were not in States geographically contiguous with the home 
State of the parent company to register as holding companies and permitted 
registered holding companies to maintain only those subsidiaries that carried 
out activities related to the generation and transmission of electricity (for 
example, fuel supply). 
The reason for introduction of the reform act now is a Set of 
circumstances which led to increased costs of capital for utiilty companies 
in the 1970s. These circumstances include the effects of high inflation and 
high interest rates on the cost of utility construction. The rising cost of 
fuel oil and the cost of environmental protection devices that are required 
to accompany coal-fired plants led many utilities to decide to build nuclear 
plants. These require nearly twice as long to build as coal plants, and 
under conditions of high interest and inflation rates cost several times as 
much. In States where construction work in progress was not admitted to the 
rate base and rate increases often came too little and too late because of 
regulatory lag, some utilities found themselves desperately short of cash. 
Under these circumstances, the bond ratings of many utilities suffered, 
increasing the cost of capital to these companies. The present efforts to 
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reform PUHCA are designed to reduce the cost of capital to utilities. 
Sponsors of S. 1174 and H.R. 2994 say that many of the abuses perpetrated 
by the holding companies prior to passage of PUHCA in 1935 were accounting 
practices which currently accepted accounting standards make impossible to 
repeat. Sponsors also say that the-effects of those provisions of PUHCA that 
deal with public disclosure of information about companies and their 
securities are substantially duplicated in the SEC's implementation of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Hence, if 
PUHCA is changed, the protections against the abuses PUHCA was enacted to 
prevent will remain in effect. They add that reform will provide for 
examination of the books of utility subsidiaries by State public utility 
commissions (thereby preventing the draining off of utility revenues by 
unregulated subsiaiaries) and will empower the SEC to review cases in which 
it is alleged that utility revenues are being invested in subsidiaries, when 
the State commission requests the SEC to do so. 
Opponents of the reform act note that many State commisssions are neither 
empowered nor equipped to oversee diverse business activities, and for those 
that are the degree varies widely. SEC examination of records concerning 
non-utility activities is required under the provisions of the reform bills 
(S. 1174 and H.R. 2994) Only at the request of State authorities. Many fear 
that under these circumstances, the holding companies may funnel utility 
revenues into unregulated businesses that could lose money because utility 
managers are not experienced in managing non-utility businesses or in dealing 
with risk. 
Moreover, opponents of the reforms say that if the subsidiary business 
should be successful in bringing higher profits to the holding company than 
the utility, holding company managers may lose the incentive to give top 
priority to providing utility service to customers. Under such 
circumstances, utilities might be less responsive to State commissions, upon 
which the companies would no longer depend for revenues. 
Default of the Washington Public Power Supply System 
On June 15, 1983, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington ruled that 
the Washington municipalities participating in the construction of the 
cancelled nuclear power plants of the Washington Public Power Supply System 
(WPPSs) are not responsible to pay the $2.25 billion debt on the plants. 
With the participants released from their obligations to pay the supply 
system, the supply system could not make additional interest payments to the 
bondholders for plants #4 and #5. Thus, the supply system has defaulted on 
the bonds. Default on the bonds of plants #4 and #5 makes it impossible for 
the supply system to sell bonds to complete plant #3, which is now 75% 
complete. The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) estimates that placing 
the cost of completing plant #3--just under $1 billion--in its rate base 
would necessitate rate increases of 20% over the next 3 years. Senator 
McClure has introduced S. 1701, a bill which would create a financial entity 
separate from WPPSS to raise money to complete plant #3. Opponents of the 
bill say the rate payers, who will eventually have to pay for completion, 
would be wasting their money to complete plant #3 since they say, its power 
will never be needed. Congressman Hausen has submitted a bill (H.R. 3152) 
which would empower the BPA to buy all five of the WPPSS nuclear plants. 
The financial problems of WPPSS began in 1976. At that time, the Supply 
System had already begun work on three nuclear plants with the support of the 
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Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Federal power marketing agency .in 
the region, which had contracted to buy the power the first three plants 
would produce. 
As was generally the case across the United States in the 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  regional 
projections made in the Pacific Northwest indicated that demand for 
electricity would rise in the early 1980s to a much higher level than it has. 
In 1976, on the premise that demand would rise sharply, 88 WPPSS Participants 
undertook the construction of two additional nuclear plants (#4 and #5). 
According to the Participants, the BPA had urged them to build plants #4 and 
#5 for the good of the region despite the fact that BPA could not, because of 
an IRS ruling, guarantee the support in the form of net billing it had 
committed to the first three plants. The Participants assert, therefore, 
that since the plants were undertaken for the good of the region under 
Federal leadership, the region and the Federal Government should help resolve 
the problem. 
In January 1982, plants #4 and #5 were cancelled when 15% and 24% 
complete, respectively. Cancellation was caused partly by plummeting demand 
projections, and partly by escalating costs engendered by delays in 
construction combined with rising interest rates and inflation. The passage 
of Initiative 394 in Washington State in November 1981 also played a role in 
the cancellation (though in later court tests Initiative 394 was found to be 
unconstitutional). Initiative 394 forbade the Supply System to issue bonds 
after July 1982 for any of the five nuclear plants under construction. 
Cancellation of plants #4 and #5 left the 88 Participants with only the 
revenues from their existing systems with which to pay the $7 billion debt on 
the cancelled plants. This would have required rate increases which many 
ratepayers refused to pay, since the plants were not expected ever to 
generate power. For this reason, the majority of Participant utilities 
refused to make payments to the Supply System's fund for debt repayment. In 
response, the Chemical Bank of New York (the bond trustee) sued the 
participants to establish their liability for the debt. It was in this suit 
that the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the contracts were invalid 
because the Participants were not authorized by Washington State law to make 
such agreements. 
In December 1983, a blue ribbon (Luce) commission authorized by the 
governors of Washington and Oregon proposed a settlement of the issue. The 
commission proposed that Congress establish a new Federal entity to take over 
management of all WPPSS projects. This entity would complete WPPSS plants 1 
and 3, and would levy a surcharge on all BPA ratepayers averaging $1 per 
month, which would serve to pay off the bonds sold to finance WPPSS 4 and 5 
at 36 cents on the dollar. Press reports indicated that reaction to the 
proposal was negative among both rate payers and shareholders. The proposal 
has not yet been presented as legislation. 
LEGISLATION 
H.R. 555 (Harkin)/S. 1069 (Chafee et al.) 
Amends the Federal Power Act by altering the FERC's criteria for admitting 
construction work in progress to a public utility's rate base. Requires the 
FERC to approve any rate increase that is based on the proposed or ongoing 
construction of pollution control facilities or conversion of oil- or 
gas-fired facilities to the use of other fuels, so long as the increase is 
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just and reasonable. As to other types of construction, the FERC must allow 
rate increases based on CWIP only if it determines, after a hearing, that the 
construction is necessary to meet consumer energy demand at the lowest 
possible cost; that those charged for CWIP would benefit from the 
construction and have been given a fair opportunity to acquire an ownership 
interest in the facility in question; and that, without the rate increase, 
the utility would be in severe financial difficulty not attributable to 
mismanagement. H.R. 555 introduced Jan. 6, 1983; passed by the House of 
Representatives, Feb. 8, 1984. S. 1069 introduced Apr. 15, 1983; referred to 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Regulation. 
Hearings scheduled Apr. 12, 1984. 
S. 817 (Metzenbaum) 
Bars admission of CWIP to rate base for any cost other than fuel-switching 
or pollution control. Introduced Mar. 16, 1983; referred to Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Regulation. Hearings scheduled 
Apr. 12, 1984. 
H.R. 3152 (Hansen) 
Provides the Administrator of Bonneville Power a $1 billion fund with 
which to buy outstanding bonds for WPPSS plants #1, #2, #3, # 4  or #5. The 
Administrator shall pay the lowest of (1) par value of bond, (2) price paid 
for the bond by the owner, or (3) average price for the bond on Mar. I, 1983. 
Requires BPA Administrator to maintain all five plants in condition at 
purchase until directed by Congress to use or dispose of them. Introduced 
May 26, 1983; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
Amends PUHCA to permit registered public utility holding companies to own 
subsidiaries that are not functionally related to electric generation and 
permits the holding company to invest up to 10% of its assets in such 
companies without SEC oversight and more than 103 if the SEC approves. 
Requires the SEC to approve or disapprove holding company security issuances 
within 20 days of application and removes the requirement for the SEC to 
review certain kinds of stock issuances. S. 1174 introduced Apr. 28, 1983; 
referred to Committee on Banking. H.R. 2994 introduced May 12, 1983; 
referred to more than one committee. 
Empowers BPA Administrator to enter BPA into Contracts to pay costs of the 
Federal Base System. Introduced July 28, 1983; referred to Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources. Hearings held Aug. 3, 1983. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
Admitting CWIP to the Rate Base 
1983 -- FERC changed its rule on CWIP, now allowing 
utilities under its jurisaiction to file for rates 
that include a rate of return on up to 50% of their 
investment in CWIP. The extent of the inclusion would 
be limited to amounts that would increase rates by no more 
than 6% per year above what they would otherwise be. 
1976 -- FERC ruled that CWIP may be admitted to the FERC-regulated 
segment of the rate base only for construction related to 
fuel-switching, pollution control, or severe financial 
difficulty. 
Default of the Washington Public Power Supply System 
1983 -- Washington State Supreme Court ruled that the 
Participants are not responsible to pay the $2.25 billion 
debt for cancelled plants #4  and #5. 
-- --Supreme Court declined to review 9th Circuit of Appeals 
ruling that Initiative 394 is unconstitutional. 
1982 -- Plants #4 and #5 were cancelled. 
1981 -- In reaction to rapidly multiplying costs, initiative 394 
was passed, barring WPPSS from selling additional bonds to 
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complete any of the five nuclear plants withput another 
initiative. 
1980 -- Congress passed Pacific Northwest Electric Power and 
Conservation Act requiring all new means of generating 
capacity to be cost-effective compared with conservation. 
1976 -- WPPSS began construction of two additional nuclear 
plants ( # 4  and #5), securing financing through take-or-pay 
agreements. 
1969 -- Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and Washington Public 
Power Supply System (WPPSS) established net billing arrangement 
for nuclear plants #1, #2, and #3. 
Reevaluating the Public Utility Holding Company Acts 
1982 -- Attempt to pass reform and then repeal of PUHCA unsuccessful. 
1935 -- Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) passed primarily 
to end holding company abuses of investors and ratepayers made 
possible by multi-state holding company structures, which made 
regulation ineffective. 
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